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“Imagination is the mode of thought most precisely suited to the vagueness of the 
virtual.” (Massumi, 2002: 134). Massumi’s note is important as it strangely enough 
adds precision to the attempts to grasp what imagination is. This history involves 
several central thinkers in European intellectual history, including Aristotle, Hume, 
Kant, Heidegger, Bergson, and Deleuze. On the American side of this history, we will 
have to add William James, but for the purpose of this paper, we will try to confine 
the discussion to one where our processual theorisation can be extended. Deleuze 
worked out several of the hallmarks of his philosophy in his early (1953/1991) study 
of David Hume’s theory of human nature (1739-40). One of those hallmarks is the 
idea of immanence (others being multiplicity; thinking as synthesis, experimentation, 
and invention; rejection of totalisation; seeing transcendence as illusion) which 
receives from Hume the idea that the subject is not the ground of experience, but 
produced on the level of practice, as an effect of synthesis in (not by) the mind 
(Deleuze, 1991: 92). Mind, as well as matter, is an attribute of life and not some 
separate substance from which the world is thought. The brain connects with other 
parts of the body and with the world (other bodies and relationships to the world) and 
form images/perceptions. One of those images is that of the mind. Its foundational 
status is but an illusion. This answers to a relational ontology: something is (achieves 
being) only as response. The mind ‘is’ the image that results from a response – the 
brain’s to the world. “Before there are actual terms – ‘mind’ on the one hand, ‘world’ 
on the other – there is a potential for relation, and relations for Deleuze are best 
described as ‘images’” (Colebrook, 2006: 5). 
 
It follows that this kind of empiricism – centred on Deleuze – suggests that fiction-
telling, inventing of stories of futures, or – our preferred term – fabulation, is central 
to human nature. There would be no mind without the fantastic image of a mind, and 
this image is a product of life’s inventive powers. There is no primacy of either the 
faculty of understanding (as in Kant’s critique of pure reason), nor of the faculty of 
reason (as in Kant’s critique of practical reason). Nor is there the crisis of the disorder 
of the senses that Kant struggles with in his critique of judgement (where the sublime 
and imagination play a key role for the production of this crisis). Instead, there is an 
affirmation of this disorder and a turn to life’s immanent creative/inventive powers. 
Imagination, Deleuze suggests, is a synthesis of time and his reading of Hume 
resulted in the idea: based on the difference that the mind draws from repetition (the 
self is this drawing of difference), imagination anticipates and creates the future. 
Rather than starting from the image of the mind, Deleuze thus wants us to look at this 
create force of life, the force that creates Gods and Giants (as Bergson put it) – the 
force that has created also the image of the foundational mind, a force we here 
describe as fabulation. From this shifting of perspective, we can see how the image of 
mind, or subjectivity for that reason, becomes imprisonments of our power of 
becoming. Multiplicity is reduced via transcendence (the subject’s status as 
guaranteeing the consistency of the faculties) and totalisation (theory as informing or 
directing practice). 
 
Fabulation would then be this narrative expression of life’s creative tendency to 
produce images and futures. Moving images and people may be described as hinging 
on whether one can free them from investments in images and representations – that 
is, if decoding can take place. One example of a powerful image is of course 
Descartes’ cogito, always present in relationship to the conceptual persona of the 
lonely, doubting Descartes-on-travel (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994). Fabulation, to 
some extent already in Bergson but definitely in Deleuze’s appropriation of the 
concept and his adding to it a political dimension, carries also the power to free us 
from the limits of the present. Imagination, we have noted above, is that mode of 
thought that represents a small crisis in Kant’s attempt to unite the faculties under 
common sense. Imagination gives rise to a disjunctive theory of the faculties 
(Deleuze, 1997: 210; Smith, 1996: 33) as we have to deal with the power of thinking, 
not as a representational power of reason, but as an inventive power presenting 
images of a world to come. Imagination thus breaches the unity of reason in a leaping 
that spring from sensible experience. Imagination does not organise our experience 
but goes beyond it, challenges its present limits (cf. Colebrook, 2002: 81). It seems to 
me that we can describe the role of imagination for Kant as a disturbing one, 
provoking him to minimise its role in discussing how it plays together with 
understanding (Crockett, 2001). Deleuze instead finds imagination important 
precisely as it seems to point at a higher faculty (than knowledge, desire, and feeling) 
which is what makes us genuinely creative, moving beyond our present limits as we 
fabulate. Affect has this function in Deluze’s philosophy; it produces suspense, a 
breaking-free from the continuity of reason, as pause in which we are powered up in 
our receptivity so that our capacity to affect others increases. We will call this time 
the time of passion. 
 
Imagination then plays a crucial role in provoking these times of passion. Fabulation 
is described by Bergson as a creativity that “…fulfils its ends by creating 
hallucinatory fictions – vivid, haunting images that imitate perception and induce 
action, and thereby counteract the operations of judgement and reason. Fabulation, 
then emerges in the shock of an event, a vertiginous moment of disorientation in 
which images bypass reason and work directly on the senses to induce action.” 
(Bogue, 2006: 207) We can recognise how Bergson is trying to make space for his 
concept of fabulation vis-à-vis Kant’s faculty of imagination (they come close in 
Bergson’s description, although this is summarised here by Bogue). Deleuze, instead, 
contrasts fabulation with utopia and says the latter is too programmatic, simply not 
good enough if we want to understand how a ‘minor people’ (politically and not 
necessarily numerically ‘less’, such as women vis-à-vis men) can resist and transform 
majorities (the dominant group) by fabulating a world-to-come for the missing people 
(Deleuze, 1998). Bergson contrasted fabulation with élan vital and saved for the latter 
the true creative force that would result in an open society of love, whereas the former 
(as he discusses this in relationship to religion) would end in static societies of 
morality. Deleuze instead seems to move fabulation closer to the concept of élan vital 
as he conjoins the political force of the creative collective with the artistic force of 
inventing a missing people in his appropriation of fabulation: “For Deleuze, the 
fabulative function is the function proper to art, which projects into the world images 
so intense that they take on a life of their own.” (p. 218)  
 
Fabulation is sensed viscerally; we register intensity as we are moved into suspense, 
the pause created by falsifying received truths central in the re-production of 
dominant social orders. The receptivity of power’s ability to be affected and the 
spontaneity of power’s ability to affect (Deleuze, 1988: 71) play together in the 
relationship between the fabulator and the affected. Imagination is crucial in this 
relationship as it is what creates the break with the continuity of reason, which in turn 
provides material for the fabulation. Having falsified received truths there is a time of 
suspense to make use of. Here is where we could turn to entrepreneurship as figured 
on the idea of creating and making use of opportunities (Hjorth, 2003; Gartner, 
Carter, and Hills, 2003). The opportune act is what brings us towards the harbour 
(referring here to the Latin meaning of ob + portus, meaning toward, port/harbour). 
Harbour is a refuge, meaning an escape or to flee (from Latin refugere). Here is where 
‘the entrepreneur’ shines through as a conceptual persona of social creation processes. 
The drama of creating a ‘line of flight’ (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994) – of articulating 
and acting towards an opportunity – is one that makes the concept of 
‘entrepreneurship’ necessary. Crucial here is the fabulation’s articulation or 
expression of the flightline, of the imagined ‘nextness’, that provokes the world to 
become something it is not. I have described this as fabulation, and we can connect 
this now to the concept of flightline with Smith (1998: xlv):  
 
“…’fabulation’ is a function that extracts from them [the dominant stories or 
discourses presently ordering the social, my comment] a pure speech act, a 
creative storytelling that is, as it were, the obverse side of the dominant myths 
and fictions, an act of resistance whose political impact is immediate and 
inescapable, and that creates a line of flight on which a minority discourse and 
a people can be constituted.”  
 
Let us now bring the above discussions into an investigation of subjectification, how 
becoming-entrepreneur happens in the opening/break/suspense that fabulation creates. 
We are interested, in particular, in how intensity is provided by this artistic-political 
force of fabulation, and how this ‘electrification’ of the social provides a passionate 
time where the power to be affected and the power to affect are important forces.  
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